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IN GENERAL
The Probate Code in Ohio gives the surviving spouse of a
deceased person one-third or one-half of the deceased's estate
in fee if such spouse takes by law and against the will of the
deceased. This is a much more substantial interest than the
former dower interest. Consequently, there is apt to be an in-
crease in instances of a surviving spouse electing to take against
the will of the deceased. Where the will provides for future
interests to take effect at the termination of a preceding estate
devised to the husband or wife, such renunciation by the sur-
viving spouse gives rise to the problem of acceleration of future
interests. For example, if the testator gives an estate to his
wife for life with remainder to A, will A's future interest
become a present one if the wife renounces? The problem may
also arise where a life tenant beneficiary is a witness to the will
and for that reason is unable to take under the will or where
the grantee or devisee of a preceding estate is without capacity
to take.
The problem of acceleration may well be divided into two
parts. One where there is no distortion and the other where
there is distortion. By distortion is meant an upsetting of the
testator's scheme of disposition in a manner which affects inter-
ests created by the will other than the renounced interest and
the future interest which followed the renounced interest. The
meaning of distortion in acceleration cases may be explained
with the aid of some illustrations. If the surviving spouse
should renounce but refuse to take the distributive share per-
mitted by law there is no distortion, since no other interests
created by the will could be affected adversely. Again, if there
were no other interests save the spouse's life estate and the
remainder after it, there would be no distortion as no other
interests would be affected even though testator's scheme of
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disposition would be disturbed since the spouse would be en-
titled to part of the future interest under the Ohio law. Other
interests will be disturbed by the renunciation in many cases.
The significance of distortion in acceleration cases depends on
how great the distortion is and whom it affects. If the loss to
other prospective devisees is slight or if it falls upon a residuary
devisee who apparently was not a primary object of the testa-
tor's bounty, the court is likely to disregard the loss and treat
the case as one concerning acceleration where there is no dis-
tortion. On the other hand, if the loss falls upon a specific or
residuary beneficiary where such beneficiary was intended to be
a chief beneficiary the court is more apt to consider the loss and
to permit its attitude toward the problem of acceleration to be
influenced or controlled by the possible distortion.
Where there is no problem of distortion the most difficult
question presented on renunciation by the surviving spouse is
whether the court should look beyond the formal character of
the future interest in deciding if it should be accelerated. It is
sometimes supposed that if the future interest is vested it will
be accelerated, but if it is contingent it will not be accelerated.
If the future interest is vested in the sense that it will take
effect whenever and however the preceding estate terminates,
the courts generally have no hesitancy in saying that on renunci-
ation the future interest takes effect as a present estate. This
may be true even though the limitation is "to my wife for life
and on the death of my wife to X." This latter phrase has been
construed to mean any termination of the wife's estate, by death
or otherwise. Simes, Law of Future Interests (936), Sec. 752.
Acceleration where there are vested interests ordinarily seems
to accord with the testator's general intent. However, if the
testator's expressed intent shows that an interest normally
regarded as vested should not take effect presently, it should
not be accelerated since an acceleration should not be permitted
to defeat the testator's intent.
Courts have been reluctant to permit an acceleration of con-
tingent interests. If it is dear that the testator intended a literal
compliance with the stipulated condition, no acceleration should
be permitted. But the general intent of the testator as gleaned
from the entire instrument may support an inference that he
did not intend a literal compliance with the condition at all
events. Suppose, for example, we have a devise to the wife for
life and on her death the remainder to the children then sur-
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viving. If the wife renounces, the courts will normally accelerate
the interest in the children. Simes, op. cit., Sec. 756. According
to accepted rules of construction, the above limitation would be
considered contingent in form and so the children would have
to survive the wife before they could take their interest in pos-
session. Why do some courts accelerate such a remainder? In
answering this question, it must be remembered that the testator
probably had given no thought to the possibility of renunciation
and that his specific intent in that event is not known. So the
acceleration under such circumstances seems to be a process of
re-construing the general intent of the testator in the light of an
unanticipated event. If the testator intended the contingent
remainder to be postponed only for the purpose of letting in
the preceding estate, a means of providing for the surviving
spouse, the court should not insist upon a strict compliance with
the contingency set forth in the will, but should accelerate such
a contingent future interest. In such a situation the court should
not let the literal form of one clause in the will control over the
general intention of the testator as evidenced by his scheme of
distribution. So the true basis of acceleration is not the vested
or contingent form of the future interest, but an estimate of
the testator's general intent as found from a re-construction of
the will in view of the unanticipated event of renunciation. A
good many courts have taken this view; Simes, op. cit., Sec. 756.
The Ohio courts have not consistently done so.
ACCELERATION WHERE THERE IS NO PROBLEM
OF DISTORTION
Future interests which are in form vested have presented
very little difficulty to Ohio courts in the problem of accelera-
tion. In Millikin v. Welliver, 37 Ohio St. 460 (1882) the
testator left a life estate in all his property to his wife and the
residue to relatives. The wife was held to take by law. The
court made the "future interest" in the relatives a present
interest dating from the time of testator's death subject to the
wife's dower which was not assigned in the case as the wife
died shortly after the testator. The future interest was vested
so that the case is merely an illustration of the application of
the general rule that vested future interests will be accelerated.
In Davidson v. Miners and Mechanics Savings and Trast
Co., 129 Ohio St. 418 (1935) the court accelerated a vested
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interest. But they said in a dictum that the general rule was
that a contingent remainder would not be accelerated. This
statement was unwarranted by the facts of the case. The actual
holding of the court seems inequitable. By the terms of the
will the wife was given a life estate in one-half with remainder
to a hospital and B was given a life estate in the other half
with the remainder to a church. The wife renounced and was
given one-half in fee. (This shows the possible advantage to
a spouse in taking against the will under the present provisions
of the Probate Code). The court gave B a life estate in one-
half of the remaining one-half of the estate with remainder in
that portion of the estate to the church. The court accelerated
the remainder to the hospital so that it took a present interest
in the one-half of the one-half remaining after the wife took
her half of the entire estate. Though the interest in the hos-
pital was vested, this would seem to be a situation where a
formal vested remainder should not have been accelerated. If
the question of acceleration is to be determined on the basis of
reconstruction of the will according to what the testator would
have done if he had known of the renunciation, it would not
seem reasonable in the light of the provisions of the will that
one of the charities should get more than the other. A result
which would seem to have been more in accord with the tes-
tator's probable intent would have been to let B have a life
estate in the entire one-half and to let the charities divide the
remainder. In this case the interests of other beneficiaries, B,
the hospital and the church, were disturbed by the wife's renun-
ciation so that there was distortion; but the court did not regard
this as sufficiently important to become a factor in the problem.
The dissenting judges thought it was a factor since they based
their holding on previous Ohio cases which definitely involved
distortion as a factor in the case.
In Holt v. Lamb 17 Ohio St. 374 (1867) the testator gave
a life estate to one G. S. and then provided that after the de-
cease of G. S. the land should be sold and divided equally
between G. S.'s four daughters, R, S, P, and'M. The will was
admitted to probate but later set aside in a contest suit to which
the four daughters were not made parties. One year after
G. S.'s death, they brought this suit to recover the land from
defendant who acquired it by mesne conveyance from one who
had purchased the land at a sheriff's sale in a partition suit
among testator's heirs. The court held that the four daughters
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were not bound by the decision which declared the will should
be set aside as they were not parties to it. The court further
said conceding that the contest suit terminated G. S.'s life estate
still the daughters' interests did not arise until G. S.'s death.
Therefore, a tide by adverse possession was not acquired against
them. The court said the daughters' estate was one to com-
mence at the happening of a particular event, G. S.'s death, and
could not become possessary during his life although his life
estate terminated in the contest suit. The interest in the daugh-
ters seems to have been a vested remainder although the court
spoke of it as an equitable right to have the land sold. Even
though it was vested, the court's decision is correct if the gen-
eral intent of the testator was that the event should happen
before the daughters' estate was to take effect in possesison.
It is doubtful, however, if such was his intent.
A somewhat similar situation arose where the testator gave
his wife a life estate with remainder over to certain relatives.
There was a power in the executor to sell after the death of the
wife. She took under the will. She sold her life estate to the
remaindermen who then desired to have the power of sale
exercised though the wife was still living. The court of ap-
peals in Aldenderfer v. Spangler 22 Ohio App. 123 (1926)
held that the power to sell was independent of the estate and
that it could not be accelerated. It correctly said that the sale
of the life estate to the remaindermen was not such a termina-
tion of the life estate as to accelerate the remainder. That is a
problem of merger, but the power to sell might still have been
accelerated since it was apparently for the protection of the
widow and it could not serve that purpose after she sold her
life estate. In Weller v. Weller, Extr. 32 Ohio N.P. (N.S.)
329 (1934) the court of common pleas handled an acceleration
problem nicely and seems to have reached a result not entirely
consistent with the A ldenderfer case. The testator devised
shares of stock in trust for his wife for life and provided that
the trust should terminate at the death of the wife, the principal
going to the trustee absolutely. There was a provision that the
trustee could not sell without the consent of the wife during
her life. The court in giving instructions to the executrix said
if the wife renounced and took by law the beneficial estate in
the trustee would vest immediately. In addition, the court
said that the trustee could sell the stock during the wife's life
without her consent. This disposition seems to accord with the
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testator's probable general intent. It is not likely that the tes-
tator meant to require the consent of his widow to a sale of the
property if the widow had no estate in the property. Although
this decision would seem to be more in accord with the testator's
general intentions than is the decision in the Aldenderfer case,
there is some merit to the Aldenderfer decision as a matter of
policy since in subsequent cases remaindermen would be less
likely to try to induce a widow to part with her specific life
estate if a similar power is not exercisable until the happening
of the contingency for which the testator provided.
The case of the Fourth & Central Trost Co. v. The Hen-
derson Lithographing Co. 21 Ohio App. 257 (1926) is espe-
cially interesting since it shows that the true approach to the
problem of acceleration is one of construing the intention of a
testator in the light of the unexpected termination of the pre-
ceding estate. The testator devised shares of stock to a trustee.
The trustee was to vote the stock according to the wish of the
testator's eldest son. The testator wished this son's influence
to dominate the company. The trustee was to divide the divi-
dends among all of the testator's children and at the death of
the eldest son, the trustee was to divide the stock per stirpes
among the testator's children and their issue. The company
in which the stock was held was sold and dissolved with the
consent of all the parties. The eldest son wished the trustee
to invest the funds in legal securities and continue the trust.
The other children wished immediate distribution. The court
of common pleas in 26 Ohio N.P. (N.S.) 249 (1925) said
that this was a situation analogous to the wife renouncing
and so the final distribution could be accelerated. The court
said "at the death" meant any termination of the eldest son's
estate. The court further said that it would make no difference
whether the future interest was vested or contingent; in either
instance it could be accelerated. The court finally rested its
decision on the ground that since the eldest son's influence
could not be carried on in the company, the purpose of the trust
failed and since the testator's other purpose was an equal dis-
tribution among all the children, the latter purpose should be
carried out immediately. The court of appeals in 21 Ohio App.
257 (1926) affirmed the case on this latter ground not men-
tioning acceleration. The lower court by its suggestion of the
possibility of accelerating either vested or contingent interests
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illustrates the view which seems preferable. The decision shows
that in the last analysis acceleration is a matter of construing the
testator's intention with regard to the unforeseen termination
of the preceding estate. The fact the court saw the analogy of
the acceleration situation and rests its decision on the failure
of the trust purpose - a pure intent question - bears out the
suggestion that we must look to the testator's intention rather
than merely to the formal nature of the future interest, whether
contingent or vested.
Future interests which are in form contingent are the source
of considerable confusion in the problem of acceleration. The
difference of opinion as to whether a contingent interest can be
accelerated was shown in the discussion of the dicta in the
Davidson and The Fourth & Central Trust Co., cases, supra.
In Stevens, Exr. v. Stevens, 121 Ohio St. 49o (1929) there
was a trust in which the widow was given a life estate. At her
death the land was to be sold and the proceeds distributed as
follows: $1,5oo to A should he then be living, $i,ooo to B
should he then be living, $5oo each to C and D. The widow
renounced. In a suit by the executor for instructions, the court
said that the interests in A and B could not be accelerated since
by the use of the words "should he then be living" the testator
meant that A and B should not take unless they were alive at
the widow's death. Apparently the court allowed C's and D's
interests to be accelerated since their interest was not subject
to such an expressed contingency. The testator had expressed
no intention as to what distribution should be made if the widow
renounced. Inasmuch as A and B were the principal benefici-
aries other than the widow, it is reasonable to suppose that the
testator would have given them an immediate estate if he had
known that the widow would not take a life estate. Here, be-
cause the remainder was contingent in form, the court compelled
the chief beneficiaries to bide the event, but allowed the sec-
ondary beneficiaries to take a present interest because the limi-
tation to them was in form vested. The court failed to realize
that the remainder was only contingent in form but was prob-
ably not intended to be contingent should the wife renounce.
It did not reconstrue the testator's intent in the light of the
unforeseen event.
In contrast with the decision in the Stevens case, the court
of appeals in Blocker v. Trick, 8 Ohio App. 222 (1917) accel-
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erated an executory estate. In this case there was an estate for
ten years in the widow. The property was then to be-sold and
the proceeds distributed to the testator's children. The widow
renounced. The court held this accelerated the enjoyment of
the children's estate subject to the widow's dower. The court
stated that the children took the entire estate by intestacy. The
holding that the children took by intestacy seems dearly wrong.
The children took a future interest under the will which inter-
est by acceleration became a present interest. However, the
decision is equitable because the result accorded with what the
testator probably would have intended under the circumstances.
Usually courts have been reluctant to say that an executory
estate will take effect in possession on any other event than that
stipulated by the testator. The principal case seems to be the
better approach.
The court of common pleas in Dymond v. Dymond, 12 Ohio
N.P. (N.S.) 5o6 (1912) rendered a decision which permitted
the acceleration of a remainder which was contingent in form.
The widow was given a life estate. After her death the prop-
erty was to go half to the testator's brother and half to the
brother's children then living and to the issue of the children
who had died. The wife renounced. The plaintiff argued that
only those children living at the wife's death could take under
the terms of the will. Consequently, the estate in the children
must remain a future interest until the widow's death. The
court accelerated the remainders saying that by "death", the
testator meant any termination of the life estate. He said that
the remainder was merely postponed for the purpose of bene-
fiting the widow during her life. The purpose being defeated
by the renunciation, the remainders should become present
interests since that is the result that testator would probably
have intended. Although the court said the brother's children
had a vested remainder it would have made no difference if in
form they had a contingent remainder. In either instance, the
purpose for postponing the remainder ceased when the widow
renounced.
ACCELERATION WHERE THERE IS A PROBLEM
OF DISTORTION
Probably the most difficult problem involved in acceleration
occurs where there is the distortion described above. While it
is true that where such distortion appears, the decision of each
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case must rest upon its particular facts, yet it is believed that a
fundamental theory can be applied which will harmonize in
principle with the acceleration cases where there is no distortion
and which will tend to make possible an equitable disposition
of all cases. The usual theory presented by the cases is that
where there is distortion the future interest will not be acceler-
ated but the court of equity will sequester the interest renounced
by the surviving spouse and apply it to satisfy the disappointed
devisees and legatees on a theory of equitable compensation.
Such a theory is inconsistent with the theory of acceleration
where there is no distortion in several respects. In the latter
situation, the courts say that on renunciation there is no life
estate. Consequently, if none exists, there could be no interest
for the court to sequester for the disappointed devisees and
legatees. Again, the mere fact that certain beneficiaries are
disappointed would not seem to be a conclusive reason to pre-
vent a future interest from becoming a present interest if it
would do so if there was no distortion. Then too, the usual
theory of equitable compensation is not really applicable to
help the disappointed beneficiaries in a situation of renuncia-
tion. It applies only where a beneficiary has taken an interest
under a will and then tries to retain another interest already
held by him when the will has disposed of this second interest
to someone else. The effect of the doctrine of equitable com-
pensation is that the beneficiary cannot have both interests and
the court of equity will take the second interest to compensate
the beneficiary, who, according to the terms of the will, was to
have had it. But where a widow renounces, not only is there
no estate to sequester for the compensation of the disappointed
beneficiary, there is also no one trying to take two interests
under the will. The widow is merely taking by law. She is
not taking under the will at all. Furthermore, if the equitable
compensation theory is followed any property remaining after
the disappointed beneficiary is compensated should go to the
widow, but most all American cases say that such property
goes to the remainderman.
Professor Simes has suggested that acceleration should take
place as where there is no distortion, the future interest becom-
ing a present one. Then equity should impose a trust on the
property in the hands of the remainderman, now the holder
of the present interest, for the benefit of the disappointed
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beneficiaries. The process of compensating the disappointed
beneficiaries would then amount to a matter of marshalling the
assets. 41 Yale L.J. 659 (1932), Simes, op cit., Sec. 761. Such
a theory would be consistent with the absence of an estate to
sequester on renunciation and with the fact that the remainder-
man takes the property after the disappointed beneficiaries are
compensated. Compensation should be given to both residuary
and specific beneficiaries. It should be given, however, only if
on construction of the testator's intent in view of the unforeseen
circumstances it could be said that the beneficiary was still to
take. If in the construction of the testator's intent in the new
setting, it should seem that he would not have intended the
disappointed beneficiary to take, no compensation should be
given.
The few Ohio cases involving a distortion all follow the
generally stated rule that there will be no acceleration where
there are disappointed beneficiaries.
In Jennings v. Jennings, 2 1 Ohio St. 56 (187 I), the court
refused to accelerate the reversion which the widow inherited
as heir at law where she renounced her life estate which pre-
ceded such reversion. The court said it would sequester the
life estate to compensate the disappointed devisees. So the
dower was assigned out of the sequestered estate. The court
said the widow had no equitable right to insist that the benefit
intended by the testator as a compensation for her dower - the
renounced life estate - should be treated as a lapsed devise and
go to her, the heir, as intestate property. The decision is prob-
ably equitable. The disappointed devisees should have been
compensated. But the court's reasoning is somewhat confused.
As the plaintiff pointed out, if the widow renounced there was
no life estate to go by intestacy. It had been extinguished or
rather had never been created. The court should have acceler-
ated the widow's reversion but should have imposed a trust
upon it for her dower interest and thus compensate the disap-
pointed devisees who otherwise would have had the dower ap-
pointed from their devised interests. Thus the court would
have carried out the testator's general scheme of distribution.
Further there was no room for the doctrine of equitable com-
pensation since the widow was not claiming under the will.
Similarly in Holdren, Admr. v. Holdren, 78 Ohio St. 276
(1908), the court refused to accelerate a future interest where
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there was distortion. The widow was given one-sixth for life
with remainder in her son in fee. She renounced and her dower
interest exceeded the value of a life estate in one-sixth. The
court held that the son's remainder would not be accelerated
but that the renounced one-sixth life estate would be seques-
tered to compensate the disappointed devisees of the other five-
sixths. Again an equitable result is reached, but with the same
inconsistency of sequestering a non-existent estate, the re-
nounced one-sixth life estate. The court should have acceler-
ated the remainder and impressed it with a trust for the benefit
of the disappointed devisees. Then, if the assets were mar-
shalled according to the intention of the testator, the remainder-
man while holding the present legal title could get no more in
value than the testator intended for him and the disappointed
devisees would get more nearly the value the testator intended
them to have.
The supreme court in Trustees of Kenyon College v. Cleve-
land Trust Co., 130 Ohio St. 107 (1935), reach a similar result
and with similar reasoning and so the same criticism is appli-
cable in this decision. The facts of the case were that testatrix
gave her husband a life estate in all her property. She gave
comparatively small legacies in remainder to certain specific
beneficiaries. She gave the bulk of the remainder to the College
by means of the residuary clause. It will thus be seen that the
husband, as life tenant, and the college as the residuary legatee,
were intended to be the chief beneficiaries. The husband re-
nounced the will and took one-half of the estate as his distribu-
tive share. The specific beneficiaries desired their interests to
be construed as present ones. The court refused to accelerate
their interests, however, and said it could sequester the hus-
band's life estate for the college since the husband took a large
part of his distributive share from the portion given by the
residuary clause to the college. The court said the testatrix in-
tended the college to take a large share by the will and by this
method the intention of the testatrix could be approximated.
This case shows that the residuary devisee or legatee may be
as much entitled to compensation as a specific beneficiary.
Compare, Dunlap v. McCloud, 84 Ohio St. 272 (i9 1").
The circuit court in Wilson, Exr. v. Hall, 6 Ohio C.C. 570
(1892), aff'd without opinion in 53 Ohio St. 679 (i895),
reached quite an inequitable result in following the theories
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generally accepted in distortion cases. There the testatrix's will
gave the husband a life estate. After his death the executor
was to sell the property and distribute the money as follows:
"i. Should my sisters or either of them surviving myself and
my husband, I give either or each of them surviving five hun-
dred dollars." There were gifts to other specified legatees.
The husband renounced. The court held that his life estate
should be sequestered for disappointed beneficiaries and that if
after compensating them there should be any of the life estate
left that it should descend by way of intestacy. The court fur-
ther held that the executor could not sell the property while
the husband was alive though he had renounced and that the
sisters had to survive him to take. Though it was reasonable
to compensate the disappointed beneficiaries, it was not reason-
able to say that the remainder of the life estate after the
beneficiaries were compensated should descend by way of in-
testacy. This is carrying the fiction of sequestering an estate
which does not exist entirely too far. Most courts would have
given the property remaining after the disappointed benefici-
aries were compensated to the remainderman, Simes, op. cit.,
Sec. 761. This shows that there was no life estate sequestered
for if there were, the remaining property would of logical neces-
sity have gone to the renouncing spouse from whom it is theo-
retically sequestered. As far as the sisters' share and the power
to sell are concerned, it would have been much better to have
said that the testatrix was merely postponing the remainder
until the termination of the life estate. Since the life estate was
terminated by renunciation, it might reasonably be supposed
that the testatrix would have given the sisters a present interest
subject only to the compensation due to the disappointed bene-
ficiaries. This last could be done by imposing a trust on the
accelerated interests. On the same reasoning the power to sell
should have been exercisable after the renunciation.
In Bates, Admr. v. Creed, Admr, 2 Ohio App. 59 (1913),
aff'd in 90 Ohio St. 280 (914), the husband was given a life
estate in one property and a charity was given the remainder.
The husband was also given a fee in another property. There
were other specific beneficiaries. The husband renounced. The
court held that the remainder in the charity should be acceler-
ated to become a present interest and that the fee which the
husband renounced should be sequestered to compensate the
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disappointed legatees. This seems entirely correct. There was
no need to impress the charity's interest with a trust when full
compensation could be attained from other property. Since the
husband renounced there was no fee created in him and the
property which the court said it sequestered descended to the
heirs as intestate property. In their hands the court should have
imposed a trust for the benefit of disappointed legatees. This
result accords with the testatrix's probable general intent, as she
demonstrated by making a will that the heirs were not to get any
more than they obtained by that instrument. The case is a
striking illustration of how far a court may go in revising the
expressed dispositions of the will on the basis of the court's
impression of testatrix's general intent.
CONCLUSION
It is believed that acceleration should be treated as a prob-
lem of reconstruing the intention of the testator as gathered
from the provisions of the will in the light of an unforeseen
event which usually is renunciation. The mere character of a
remainder, whether vested or contingent, should have bearing
on the question only in so far as the testator's intent can be
gleaned from such form. This is the tendency of most of the
courts today. The Ohio courts have in most of the cases reached
an equitable result but certain dicta and a few holdings seem to
embrace an incorrect rationale. In distortion cases the Ohio
courts have been confused in theory. This is particularly appar-
ent when we compare that theory with the theory of the accel-
eration cases where there is no distortion. It is submitted that
the courts should treat both parts of the acceleration problem
as a reconstruction of the testator's probable intent. Since the
renunciation extinguishes the surviving spouse's estate created
by will, the court in most instances should accelerate any future
interest following the spouse's estate since in the majority of
instances this is what the testator would have intended. The
only distinction which should be drawn between cases where
there is no distortion and those where there is such a factor, is
that in the latter cases the accelerated interest should be im-
pressed with a trust for the benefit of disappointed beneficiaries
to the extent that this is necessary to carry out the testator's gen-
eral scheme of distribution.
